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Abstract
This article is based on the results of two company surveys - the
ﬁrst was conducted in 2007, before the recession 2008/2009 hit Aus-
tria, and the second was conducted in 2009 shortly after the trough of
it. We analyse ﬁrms’ reactions to the crisis and focus on their labour
market relevant decisions. Although base wages were cut more fre-
quently than in economically calm times, wage reductions continued
to be the exception rather than the rule. This indicates the existence
of nominal wage rigidities in Austria. Instead of wage cuts, ﬁrms pre-
ferred to reduce working hours and to dismiss employees. We ﬁnd that
ﬁrm speciﬁc characteristics as well as characteristics of the workforce
help explaining a ﬁrm’s probability of dismissing employees. However,
the force of the shock by which an individual ﬁrm is hit (during the
2008/2009 recession) does not inﬂuence the likelihood of dismissals.
Keywords: Wage Rigidity, Demand Shock, Micro Survey Data
JEL codes: C25, E24, J305
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Non-technical summary
This article is based on the results of two company surveys - the ﬁrst was
conducted in 2007, before the recession 2008/2009 hit Austria, and the second
was conducted in 2009 shortly after the trough of it. We analyse ﬁrms’
reactions to the crisis and focus on their labour market relevant decisions.
We document that Austrian companies are reluctant to cut base wages
not only under normal circumstances but also - albeit to a lesser extent - in
times of crisis. Although our analysis reveals that during the latest economic
crisis, more companies have reduced base wages than in non-crisis times, wage
cuts are an exception rather than the rule. While in the 2007 survey, some
2 percent of companies reported to have cut base wages over the previous
ﬁve years, an equal proportion of companies said they had done so - within
one year - during the recession 2008/2009. This conﬁrms that the frequency
of wage cuts increases during a recession and at the same time indicates the
existence of nominal wage rigidities in Austria.
Looking for explanations of nominal downward wage rigidities, we ﬁnd
that eﬃciency wage theories as well as institutional arrangements like collec-
tive wage agreements are the most popular causes indicated by our respon-
dents. Our reading of the Austrian results is that collective wage agreements
are not only a barrier to wage cuts because they literally enjoin them, but
also because of social pressure. It might be diﬃcult for a ﬁrm to cut wages,
while they are being raised for similar employees in other enterprises.
Nominal wage rigidities are responsible for companies responding to the
shock by changing labour input rather than prices. Accordingly, our results
show that while cutting base wages is always (regardless how hard the crisis6
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hit) the reaction preferred the least, the most popular reaction of Austrian
ﬁrms is cutting working hours. This is compatible with the results from
macro data showing that the reduction in employment in Austria during the
crisis was relatively mild, while the main adjustment burden was borne by
the reduction in working hours.
During the crisis we saw a signiﬁcant shift towards reducing labour costs
instead of non-labour costs. Our analysis shows that ﬁrms that were severely
hit by the crisis are signiﬁcantly more likely to cut labour costs than non-
labour costs. However, the size of the shock does not seem to aﬀect the
decision on how to reduce labour costs. The choice between dismissing em-
ployees and cutting labour costs by other means is inﬂuenced by the produc-
tion technology and workforce characteristics and not by the dimension of
the drop in demand. Companies with labour-intensive production technolo-
gies, employing a high share of young and low-skilled employees are more
likely to dismiss workers.
The Austrian example shows that wage rigidities do not necessarily lead to
a dramatic increase in unemployment, but can also be dealt with by reducing
working hours. This might, however, only be possible, when ﬁrms perceive
the crisis as a temporary phenomenon.7
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1 Introduction
The economic literature has documented downward nominal wage rigidities
on many occasions, in diﬀerent countries and with diﬀerent tools (e.g. Agell
and Lundborg, 2003; Bewley, 1999 and Dickens et al., 2007). The result
that nominal wage cuts are rare is, however, uniform, even when economic
downturns should put downward pressure on them. Our work will add to this
literature by focusing on wage rigidities in Austria not only in normal times
but also in times of recession. Severe downturns, like the one experienced in
2008/2009 seem to be a natural occasion to look whether wages are adjusted
in economic slack.
Following the work of Agell and Lundborg (1995) and Agell and Lundborg
(2003) we conducted two surveys. One on the brink of the most severe
recession in Austria since the 1930ies in 2007 and one at the trough of it in
2009. The surveys were set up within the Wage Dynamics Network (WDN),
a research network by the European System of Central Banks. Within the
WDN, researchers from the ECB and from 24 national central banks in the
EU studied the characteristics and sources of wage and labour cost dynamics
in the euro area and other EU countries.
This paper analyses wage rigidities in Austria and beyond that focuses
on diﬀerent adjustment channels in reaction to the crisis, given that wage
adjustment is diﬃcult. When base wages are rigid, ﬁrms have to adjust other
sources of labour costs. These include mainly the reduction of labour input,
either through the change in working hours or by dismissing employees. The
aim of the paper is to ﬁnd a structure behind these decisions. Which of the
ﬁrms’ characteristics are driving these decisions? Which ﬁrms are more likely8
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to dismiss employees and which are less likely?
Our survey results show that Austrian companies are indeed reluctant
to cut base wages not only under normal circumstances but also - albeit
to a lesser extent - in times of crisis. These rigidities cause companies to
respond to a recession by changing labour input rather than wages. The
most widespread reaction of Austrian companies is the reduction of working
hours, followed by the dismissal of employees. We show that the size of
the shock hitting a ﬁrm only inﬂuences the decision to reduce labour costs
instead of non-labour costs. However, what kind of labour cost to reduce
is unaﬀected by the size of the drop in demand. The decision to dismiss
employees versus reducing labour costs by other means is aﬀected by the
ﬁrm’s production technology as well as by characteristics of the workforce.
Hence, ﬁrms with a labour intensive production function and with a high
share of young and low skilled employees are more likely to dismiss workers.
This article is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the technical
details of the two surveys and the economic environment in which they were
conducted. Section 3 describes the companies’ reactions to the recession
2008/2009 and compares these results with the outcome from the survey
2007. Moreover this section investigates the driving forces of these decisions.
Possible explanations for rigidities of nominal base wages are discussed in
Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.9
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2 About the Survey
2.1 Technical Details on the Survey
The ﬁrst EU-wide company survey within the framwork of the WDN was
carried out by 17 NCBs1 in 2007, while the second survey was carried out by
(only) 10 NCBs2 in 2009. Both questionnaires were designed in a harmonised
way within the Wage Dynamics Network. Thereby we drew upon the expe-
rience of Blinder and Choi (1990), Bewley (1995, 1998, 1999), Campbell and
Kamlani (1997), Agell and Lundborg (2003), Fabiani et al. (2006), Franz and
Pfeiﬀer (2006) as well as Agell and Bennmarker (2007).
Both Austrian surveys were commissioned by the Oesterreichische Nati-
nalbank (OeNB) and conducted by the Austrian Institute of Economic Re-
search (WIFO). The pre-crisis survey started in November 2007 and took
until February 2008, including two rounds of reminder letters. A total of
3,780 ﬁrms were contacted by mail, and 557 returned the ﬁlled-in question-
naire. This corresponds to a response rate of approximately 15 percent. The
questioning of the second survey took place in summer 2009 and contacted
1,538 Austrian companies. 731 companies provided responses to the survey,
which equals a response rate of 48 percent. The much higher response rate
in the second round is most likely due to the much shorter questionnaire,
which comprised one page of questions compared to four pages in the ﬁrst
round. When comparing the answers from both surveys we only use those
1The 17 countries are Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland,
Portugal, Slovenia and Spain.
2The 10 countries are Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain.10
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ﬁrms that responded to both questionnaires. This leaves us with a sample
of 322 ﬁrms.
The samples in both surveys cover classes C to N in the Statistical Clas-
siﬁcation of Economic Activities (NACE) and are therefore representative
of the private sector of the Austrian economy.3 To correct for sampling
deﬁciencies, i.e. diﬀerences in the probability of a respondent receiving a
questionnaire and completing it, we use ex-post weights. These weights are
applied in a way that the distribution of persons employed in the net sample
as closely as possible mirrors the distribution of employment in the entire
Austrian economy.
One advantage of conducting an ad hoc survey at the ﬁrm level is ﬂexi-
bility. By asking ﬁrms directly about their decisions between cutting labour
input and wages, and how they would respond to hypothetical situations it is
possible to collect data that are otherwise diﬃcult to obtain. Such ﬁrm-level
information makes it possible to examine the eﬀects of both ﬁrms’ charac-
teristics and their economic and institutional environment on their labour
market relevant decisions. Furthermore, ﬁrm surveys typically have the ad-
vantage of providing more accurate information on wage developments than
household surveys. Nevertheless, several shortcomings inherent in ad hoc
surveys, such as low rates of response, should be borne in mind.
3Only agriculture and forestry (NACE class A) as well as mining (B) are not included
in the sample. Thus, the sectors covered in the survey contribute more than 99 percent of
the Austrian private sector’s gross value added.11
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2.2 Characteristics of the Crisis
News of high losses of IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG in July 2007 marked
the beginning of the U.S. ﬁnancial crisis spreading to Europe. While initially
it seemed that the turmoil would essentially be limited to ﬁnancial markets,
some of Austrias broader economic sentiment indicators started to decline
visibly from mid-2007 onward, others stayed constant until the end of 2007.
Austria’s GDP continued growing strongly until the ﬁrst quarter of 2008
(with a growth rate of 1.3 percent quarter-on-quarter). Hence, the ﬁrst sur-
vey round (at the end of 2007) took place in a relatively calm economic envi-
ronment. Economic forecasts for 2008 were revised down slightly to around
2 percent because of the ﬁnancial crisis. However, at that time nobody ex-
pected a hard landing let alone a recession. In the second quarter of 2008 the
growth rate dropped to 0.4 percent still remaining positive, while it turned
negative in the third quarter of 2008, marking the beginning of a four-quarter
recession.
The ﬁnancial crisis became a global economic crisis and aﬀected Austria
ﬁrst of all through a slump in exports. Real exports of goods plummeted by
approximately 25 percent between the beginning of 2008 and mid 2009. Also
industrial production decreased by 16 percent during this period. Real GDP
contracted by a total of some 5 percent. Such sharp declines in an economy’s
value added have substantial repercussions for the labour market. However,
while the number of hours worked decreased by around 5 percent and thus
to a similar extent as GDP itself, the level of employment decreased by less
than 2 percent and thus to a much smaller extent. From mid-2008 to mid-
2009, Austria’s unemployment rate climbed from 3.5 percent to 5.2 percent.12
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That is a relatively mild increase compared to historical crisis episodes and
also compared to international experiences (for further details see Stiglbauer,
2010).
At the time the second survey was conducted (i.e. at the beginning of the
third quarter of 2009), the recession had already reached its peak, and the
economy was starting to bottom out. Conﬁdence indicators started to rise
in the second quarter of 2009, and the ATX (Austrian Traded Index - the
most important equity index of the Austrian stock exchange) advanced by
some 20 percent in the ﬁrst half of 2009. However, uncertainty about future
economic developments was still high. The forecasts for 2010 predicted a
stagnation or further contraction of Austrian GDP; inﬂation was expected
to be around 1 percent in 2010 and 2011.
In order to get an idea on what the crisis meant to Austrian enterprises,
the questionnaire of 2009 contained a question (see Question 1 in Appendix
A) on the impact of the crisis on the responding company’s sales, provid-
ing six possible answer categories: Sales have (1) increased, (2) remained
unchanged, (3) declined marginally, (4) declined moderately (5) declined
strongly, and (6) declined exceptionally strongly.
Table 1 provides a summary of the replies, showing that around three
quarters of Austrian companies reported falling sales in the wake of the eco-
nomic crisis. Some 20 percent reported that sales had declined strongly, some
6 percent even said that sales had declined exceptionally strongly. Broken
down by economic sector, the survey results conﬁrm the trends implied by
the macro data.13
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Manufacturing, e.g., saw sales falling signiﬁcantly more strongly than
other industries. Strong or exceptionally strong declines in sales were re-
ported by some 43 percent of companies in manufacturing, but only by
between 15 percent and 20 percent of companies in the other sectors. In
construction, by contrast, only some 6 percent of responding companies in-
dicated that they had been faced with sharply or very sharply falling sales.
The slump in sales in manufacturing can be traced ﬁrst and foremost to the
fact that the sector is highly export oriented. The last line in Table 1 shows
that more than half of manufacturing sales in our sample are generated by
exports, which plummeted dramatically during the crisis. The export share
also explains why construction has been fairly mildly aﬀected by the crisis:
First, construction does not depend on exports; second, construction projects
require very long lead times, which delays this sector’s response to economic
developments; and third, construction has beneﬁted from the ﬁscal and eco-
nomic stimulus measures, which provided for investment in infrastructure
worth roughly EUR 1.5 billion for 2009 (see Breuss et al., 2009).
3 Firms’ Reactions to the Crisis
3.1 Cost-cutting Strategies Dominate
For most of the ﬁrms the crisis felt like a demand shock. Hence, we asked how
they had responded to this demand shock (see Question 3 in Appendix A).
We provided ﬁve diﬀerent response options, namely reducing prices, reduc-
ing output, reducing proﬁt margins, reducing costs as well as leaving prices
unchanged. The companies were asked to indicate whether these measures
had been ‘very relevant’, ‘relevant’, ‘hardly relevant’ or ‘not relevant at all’.15
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Table 2: Relevance of Diﬀerent Strategies in Response to a Demand Shock
Possible strategy Survey 2007 Survey 2009
Reduce costs 84.38 84.95
Reduce output 54.42 43.54
Reduce proﬁt margins 51.90 42.61
Leave prices unchanged 49.66 45.09
Reduce prices 30.53 23.21
Notes to Table 2: The ﬁgures are weighted by employment weights and are rescaled
excluding non-responses. They include only answers from ﬁrms that responded to both
questionnaires (2007 and 2009).
‘Very relevant’ and ‘relevant’ answers were counted as approval to a speciﬁc
measure, which is given as a percentage of all valid responses.
Table 2 (last column) shows that some 85 percent of companies considered
cost cutting a ‘very relevant’ or ‘relevant’ measure in their speciﬁc situation,
which makes it the most widespread response of enterprises to the crisis.
Signiﬁcantly fewer companies - about 45 percent - reported that for them,
cutting output, reducing proﬁt margins, and leaving prices unchanged were
key measures to cope with the crisis. Cutting prices is a measure only roughly
23 percent of companies considered to be relevant.
At the end of 2007, before companies started to feel the impact of the
crisis, the ﬁrst survey round was carried out, which comprised a question al-
most identical to this one. The only diﬀerence between the two questions was
that in the 2007 survey, the decline in demand was hypothetical, whereas the
2009 survey referred to the repercussions of the economic crisis. 322 enter-
prises took part in both surveys, enabling a comparison of response measures.
As can be seen in Table 2, the aggregate shows very similar patterns: Cut-
ting costs is considered the most important measure by far, while only a16
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Table 3: Relevance of Cost-Cutting Strategies
Cost-cutting strategies Survey 2007 Survey 2009
Cut non-labour costs 51.38 28.58
Cut working hours 20.43 33.13
Cut ﬂexible wage components 11.76 17.28
Dismiss parts of the core workforce 9.87 11.01
Dismiss temporary employees 6.56 9.55
Cut base wages 0.00 0.45
Notes to Table 3: The ﬁgures are weighted by employment weights and are rescaled
excluding non-responses. They include only answers from ﬁrms that responded to both
questionnaires (2007 and 2009).
minority regards cutting prices a relevant response to the hypothetical drop
in demand. Support for the other measures among the companies surveyed
ranges around 50 percent.
3.2 Firms Choose Mainly to Reduce Labour Costs
Those roughly 85 percent of ﬁrms that regard cost cuts as ‘highly relevant’
or ‘relevant’ in response to a demand shock were also asked in what way
they would reduce costs (see Question 4 in Appendix A). Firms could choose
from six response options, ﬁve of which focused on labour costs and one cov-
ered other costs (collectively termed non-labour costs). Labour cost-cutting
strategies included (1) reducing ﬂexible wage components, (2) cutting base
wages, (3) reducing working hours, (4) discontinuing temporary employment
contracts as well as (5) laying oﬀ permanent staﬀ. Respondents were asked
to indicate only their main cost-cutting strategy. Table 3 comprises not only
the summary of responses provided in the 2009 survey but also those of the
2007 survey.17
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Apparently, in 2009, some 70 percent of respondents have cut costs pri-
marily by reducing labour costs, while approximately 30 percent have driven
down non-labour costs. Those companies that have focused on cutting labour
costs reported to reduce working hours (33 percent of companies) or ﬂexible
wage components (some 17 percent). The options of discontinuing temporary
or permanent work contracts each accounted for approximately 10 percent
of the replies. Less than 1 percent said they mainly reduce base wages.
In international comparison it is striking that dismissing temporary em-
ployees is a reaction to the crisis of little importance in Austria. However,
temporary employees are in general a limited phenomenon in Austria. While
Eurostat ﬁgures show that the share of temporary employees in total em-
ployment is around 20 percent in the Netherlands and Portugal and around
30 percent in Spain, it is less than 10 percent in Austria.
In Figure 1 we compare the responses to this question in the two surveys
(2007 and 2009) and ﬁnd a visible shift toward cutting labour costs. When
asked how they would respond to a hypothetical decline in demand two years
earlier, some 50 percent of companies said they would mainly reduce non-
labour costs, while in 2009, only 30 percent replied that this was the most
important measure. Among the labour cost cutting strategies, especially
shortening working hours and reducing ﬂexible wage components are the
instruments that have been used more widely during the crisis than in the
2007 survey. The results of the 2007 and the 2009 surveys do not show
similarly big diﬀerences as regards layoﬀs and cutting base wages.18
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Figure 1: Cost-cutting Strategies Diﬀerentiated by How Hard the Crisis Hit
(bars giving the results of the survey 2009 and black lines indicating the













sales did not drop sales dropped marginally/moderately sales dropped (exceptionally) strongly
% of respondents
   indicate the results of the survey 2007
Moreover, as can also bee seen in the second column of Table 3, the
results show that reducing working hours was the most preferred way of
Austrian ﬁrms in dealing with the consequences of the crisis. This explains
why the decrease in employment in Austria was quite mild compared to the
slump in production and also compared to other countries. The reduction
in working time is partly due to short-time working schemes that are one of
Austria’s active labour market policies. Firms in this programme can reduce
employee’s working time, while these employees receive compensation for the
loss in salaries. As Stiglbauer (2010) argues, however, the existence of short-19
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time working schemes explain only a small part of the overall reduction in
working hours.
The available data allow us to analyse whether companies aﬀected by the
crisis to a diﬀerent extent respond to the crisis diﬀerently. Figure 1 shows that
reducing non-labour costs is a measure taken primarily by companies that
have been aﬀected by the crisis only mildly or not at all, whereas ﬁrms that
have been hit severely tend to cut costs by laying oﬀ permanent staﬀ. While
less than 10 percent of ﬁrms that indicated no or only a small drop in sales
reported to cut costs by dismissing permanent staﬀ, more than 30 percent
of the companies aﬀected severely by the crisis have taken this measure. In
other words, layoﬀs followed by shortening working hours are the most
important cost-cutting instruments applied by companies that recorded a
sharp or very sharp decline in sales.
3.3 Factors Driving the Choice of which Costs to Cut
It is likely that not only the size of the drop in turnover is driving the choice
of the main cost-cutting strategy - as discussed in Section 3.2 - but that
also other forces are relevant for this decision. Following the ﬁndings of
Bertola et al. (2010), we expect the cost structure of a ﬁrm to be essential in
this respect. Capital intensive ﬁrms, which have a high share of ﬁxed costs,
probably use other cost-cutting strategies than labour-intensive ﬁrms.
To model the decision on the main cost-cutting strategy, we deﬁne discrete
choice models. In a ﬁrst step we model the decision between cutting labour
costs on the one hand and non-labour costs on the other hand. In a second
step we analyse the more detailed decision on which kind of labour costs20
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Figure 2: Overview of the Replies to Questions 3 and 4 of the Survey 2009
731 firms in the sample
643 firms answered question 3
585 firms indicate that  57 firms indicate that 
cutting costs is a relevant option cutting costs is irrelevant
514 firms answered question 4
368 firms cut  146 firms cut
mainly mainly 
labour costs  non-labour costs
126 firms  242 firms cut
cut costs mainly costs mainly
by dismissing  by reducing 
employees working hours
and cutting wages
to cut. Figure 2 gives an overview of the answers to Question 4 that are
the basis for the following analysis. It shows how we group the answers for
presentational reasons and how many answers were given.
For all the estimations carried out in this section, the dependent variable
yi can take on two values. From the range of estimation procedures we choose
to present the probit model, as the log-likelihoods are on average slightly
higher than for our logit models. However, the results are quite similar and
the average marginal eﬀects are also close to simple OLS coeﬃcients. The21
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probit model can be written as
P[yi =1 |xi]=Φ ( x

iβ), (1)
where β is a vector of coeﬃcients, xi is a vector of explanatory variables and
Φ(·) denotes the cumulative normal distribution function.
Basically, we use two explanatory variables in this model. Firstly, we
include the size of the shock, which is deducted from the question summarised
in Table 1 and deﬁned by three dummy variables: ‘sales did not drop’, ‘sales
dropped slightly’ and ‘sales dropped signiﬁcantly’.4 Moreover, we use the
sector the ﬁrm operates in as a proxy for its production function (being
the mirror image of the cost function). Regarding the sector we distinguish
between the manufacturing sector, which is more capital intensive, and the
service sector, which is more labour intensive.
3.3.1 The Choice between Labour and Non-labour Costs
Our ﬁrst dependent variable maps the choice between cutting labour costs
and non-labour costs. Firms answering that they mainly reduce ﬂexible wage
components, cut base wages, reduce working hours, discontinue temporary
employment contracts and lay oﬀ permanent staﬀ are coded with 1, while
ﬁrms indicating that they mainly reduce non-labour costs are coded with 0.
The estimation results of this probit model are shown in Table 4. The
values given represent average marginal eﬀects (AME), as they are easier
to interpret than coeﬃcients. The AME gives the average over all marginal
4We split the six answer categories presented in Table 1 into three groups: Increasing
and unchanged sales = ‘sales did not drop’; sales declined marginally/moderately = ‘sales
dropped slightly’; and sales declined strongly and exceptionally strongly = ‘sales dropped
signiﬁcantly’.22
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Table 4: Probit Model Explaining the Decision between Cutting Labour
Costs (= 1) and Non-labour Costs (= 0)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Sector -0.16 ***
(0.03)




Slight drop in sales 0.05 0.12
(0.05) (0.09)
Signiﬁcant drop in sales 0.15 *** 0.18 *
(0.06) (0.10)
Export share 0.19 **
(0.09)
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.03 0.03
Number of observations 507 191 187
Notes to Table 4: The table gives average marginal eﬀects. Standard errors calculated
using the Delta-method are given in parenthesis. ∗∗∗(∗∗)[∗] stands for signiﬁcant at the 1
(5) [10] percent level. For the variable ‘sector’ the manufacturing sector serves as base
category. Moreover, regarding the size of the shock the ‘sales did not drop’ category serves
as the basis.
eﬀects, which indicate the change in the probability that a ﬁrm will reduce
labour costs (instead of non-labour costs) for a change in each independent,
continuous variable (in the case of indicator variables from zero to one).
As shown in the ﬁrst column of Table 4, the results of model 1 suggest
that - as expected - the decision to cut labour costs is signiﬁcantly aﬀected
by the sector of the ﬁrm and the size of the shock. Firms that are severely
hit by the crisis (with a signiﬁcant drop in sales) are on average by about 15
percentage points more likely to cut labour costs than ﬁrms with constant or
even increasing sales. This was already apparent in Figure 1. However, over23
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and above this eﬀect, ﬁrms in the service sector are on average by about 16
percentage points less likely to cut labour costs than manufacturing ﬁrms. As
we are controlling for the size of the shock, the diﬀerent reactions of industrial
and service ﬁrms should be due to other driving forces. At ﬁrst sight the sign
of the eﬀect seems counterintuitive. Associating the service sector mainly
with labour intensive production technologies, we would expect it to have
a higher probability of reducing labour costs than manufacturing ﬁrms and,
thus, we would expect a positive sign. However, it is conceivable that the
variable ‘sector’ captures more characteristics of a ﬁrm than just the labour
intensity of the production technology.
In order to investigate this question further, we deﬁne model 2, which
instead of the variable ‘sector’ includes a proxy for the labour intensity of
the ﬁrm and a proxy for its competitive environment. This information is,
however, only available from the survey 2007. Hence, the inclusion of this
information leads to a large drop in observations (from 507 to below 200), as
only those ﬁrms remain in the 2009 sample that also responded to the ﬁrst
questionnaire in 2007.
The variable ‘labour-cost share’ is deﬁned as an indicator variable. Firms
with a share of labour costs in total costs that is above the sample average
(37 percent) are coded with one, the others are coded with zero. To map
the price competitiveness of a ﬁrm, respondents were asked, as in Fabiani
et al. (2006), to indicate on a scale from 1 (‘very likely’) to 4 (‘very unlikely’)
whether they would lower their prices if their main competitor did so. In the
following analysis, this information is described by a dummy variable: All
ﬁrms that are likely and very likely to follow their main competitor’s price24
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1274
December 2010
reduction are deﬁned as being exposed to strong price competition (= 1) and
the remaining ﬁrms as facing only weak competition (= 0).
The results of model 2, which are presented in column 2 of Table 4, show
that the labour intensity of a ﬁrm indeed plays a role for its decision to cut
labour versus non-labour costs. As expected, labour-intensive ﬁrms have on
average a by about 10 percentage points higher probability to cut labour
costs than capital-intensive ﬁrms. Moreover, the eﬀect of the size of the
shock on the main cost-cutting strategy remains by and large unchanged.
For a ﬁnal robustness check, we deﬁne a third model in which we replace
the variable ‘size of the shock’ with each ﬁrm’s ‘export share’. It is a contin-
uous variable giving the share of sales earned abroad. As already described
in Section 2.2, the crisis was mainly characterised by plummeting export de-
mand and those ﬁrms with high export shares were hit most. Column 3 of
Table 4 gives the results of model 3 and shows that an increase in a ﬁrm’s
export share by 10 percentage points (thus facing a larger drop in demand)
increases the probability to cut labour costs by 1.9 percentage points.
Hence, we can conclude that not only the size of the shock matters for the
decision on whether to cut labour versus non-labour costs. Our results show
that also the cost structure being the mirror image of the production function
matters for the decision on the main cost-cutting strategy. Consistent with
the ﬁndings of Bertola et al. (2010), labour-intensive ﬁrms are more likely to
cut labour costs than capital-intensive ﬁrms.25
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3.3.2 Diﬀerent Ways of Cutting Labour Costs
After analysing the choice between labour and non-labour costs, we now turn
to investigate which ﬁrms prefer to cut labour costs via laying employees
oﬀ. Hence, we assort the ﬁve remaining answer categories into two groups,
namely dismissing temporary and permanent employees on the one hand and
reducing ﬂexible wage components, cutting base wages and reducing working
hours on the other (see Figure 2).
As before, we use probit models, where the dependent variable yi can
take on two values. Let yi be equal to one if a ﬁrm reduces labour cost by
dismissing employees and let yi be equal to zero if it reduces labour costs
by other means. The results are shown in Table 5, where in a ﬁrst step we
use the same explanatory variables as in Section 3.3.1. However, models 2
and 3 seem to be more suitable than model 1, because - as already seen in
Section 3.3.1 - the variable ‘sector’ in model 1 is only a rough proxy of a
ﬁrm’s production technology. Hence, we leave model 1 aside and focus on
models 2 and 3. This leaves us with a much smaller sample size as only those
ﬁrms remain in the sample that answered both questionnaires (in 2007 and
2009).
The results for models 2 and 3, which are displayed in Table 5, show
that ﬁrms with a high labour-cost share are on average by about 17 to 18
percentage points more likely to dismiss employees than capital-intensive
ﬁrms. Moreover, also the competitive environment of the ﬁrm seems to
matter for this decision. Firms facing higher price competition are by about
9 to 12 percentage points less likely to dismiss employees than ﬁrms facing
low competition. However, the coeﬃcient is only marginally signiﬁcant in one26
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Table 5: Probit Model Explaining the Decision between Laying Employees
oﬀ (= 1) and Reducing Labour Costs by other Means (= 0)
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Labour-cost share 0.18 *** 0.17 ** 0.18 *** 0.16 **
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Competition -0.12 * -0.09 -0.14 ** -0.13 *
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Slight drop -0.02 0.01
in sales (0.12) (0.11)
Signiﬁcant drop 0.08 0.09
in sales (0.12) (0.12)




Alternative work 0.00 -0.04
arrangements (0.36) (0.37)
Share of young 0.78 *** 0.72 **
employees (< 24y) (0.32) (0.33)
Share of high skilled -0.29 * -0.32 *
blue collar workers (0.17) (0.18)
Share of high skilled -0.24 -0.23
white collar workers (0.15) (0.15)
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.05 0.11 0.11
Number of observations 134 130 130 126
Notes to Table 5: The table gives average marginal eﬀects. Standard errors calculated
using the Delta-method are given in parenthesis. ∗∗∗(∗∗)[∗] stands for signiﬁcant at the 1
(5) [10] percent level. For the variable ‘sector’ the manufacturing sector serves as base
category. Moreover, regarding the size of the shock the ‘sales did not drop’ category serves
as the basis.27
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model and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in the other model. Finally,
the size of the shock does not seem to matter for this decision, regardless of
whether the dimension of the shock is approximated by the indicator variable
‘drop in sales’ or expressed by the continuous variable ‘export share’.
It is conceivable that not only the production technology and the size
of the shock determine the probability of dismissing employees, but that
also characteristics of the labour force itself aﬀect this decision. In order to
investigate this question further, we deﬁne models 4 and 5.
An interesting question is whether the relative shares of traditional and
non-traditional workers aﬀect the probability of employees being dismissed.
The traditional employment relationship can be deﬁned as full-time, where
the central aspects of this relationship includes an employment contract of
indeﬁnite duration. Non-traditional employment relationships are temporary
contracts and alternative work arrangements, which include independent con-
tractors, employees of contract companies, employees hired on the basis of a
contingent work contract as well as self-employed. Bertola et al. (2010) ﬁnd
that ﬁrms having a high share of temporary workers are indeed more likely
to dismiss them in times of crisis. They follow that temporary workers act as
a buﬀer against employment ﬂuctuations for permanent workers and against
wage ﬂuctuations. In the following analysis we distinguish between three
working relationships. An employment contract can be permanent/full-time
and hence traditional. Regarding non-traditional contracts we distinguish
between temporary contracts and alternative work arrangements. Each of
these three variables gives the share of the respective group in the company’s
workforce. Thus, they sum to one and we keep only two of them, namely28
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‘traditional employees’ and ‘alternative work arrangements’, which are con-
tinuous and are deﬁned to be between 0 and 1.
Moreover, Stiglbauer (2010) reports that during the crisis increasing un-
employment aﬀected young employees in Austria much more than employees
of any other age. Hence, we also include a variable representing the age
structure of the workforce. We deﬁne the variable ‘share of young employ-
ees’, which gives the percentage share of workers younger than 24 years. In
order to ﬁnd out, whether young people are being dismissed because they
are low skilled or because it is really the age that is driving this decision, we
additionally control for the skills of the workforce. Our model includes the
variables ‘share of high skilled blue collar workers’ and ‘share of high skilled
white collar workers’, while the variable ‘share of low skilled workers’ serves
as base category.
The results in Table 5 show that characteristics of the labour force it-
self indeed seem to matter for the decision to dismiss employees. However,
the hypothesis that the employment relationship (traditional versus non-
traditional workers) matters for this decision is rejected for the Austrian
labour market. Firms are equally likely to dismiss employees regardless of
the relative shares of traditional and non-traditional workers. This might,
however, be due to the fact that non-traditional employment relationships
are quite rare in Austria. The median ﬁrm in our sample has got 90 percent
of permanent/full-time employees.
The age structure as well as the skills of the workforce, however, signif-
icantly matter for the decision to dismiss employees. If the share of young
people (with age of less than 24 years) in a ﬁrm increases by 10 percentage29
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points, the likelihood of dismissals increases by 7.8 percentage points. More-
over, if the share of high skilled workers (in contrast to low skilled workers)
increases, the likelihood of dismissals decreases. An explanation for the fact
that ﬁrms with a high proportion of young employees are more likely to dis-
miss them (even when controlling for skills) can be found in the Austrian
labour market legislation. Legal norms state that employers have to take so-
cial factors into account when dismissing employees. One of these social fac-
tors for example is whether the employee is the family’s bread-earner. Hence,
age increases to a certain extent the legal protection against dismissals.
Summing up, the results of this section show that ﬁrms that were severely
hit by the crisis are signiﬁcantly more likely to cut labour costs than non-
labour costs. However, the size of the shock does not seem to aﬀect the
decision on how to reduce labour costs. The choice between dismissing em-
ployees and cutting labour costs by other means is inﬂuenced by the pro-
duction technology and workforce characteristics and not by the dimension
of the drop in demand. Companies with a labour-intensive production tech-
nology, employing a high share of young and low-skilled employees are more
likely to dismiss workers. Thereby, the age of an employee is a characteristic
on its own account and does not stand for low skills.
3.4 Firms Refrain from Cutting Base Wages
Turning back to the results of Section 3.2, we now focus on another phe-
nomenon present in Figure 1. Regardless of how hard the crisis hit, cutting
base wages is always the strategy least preferred. As presented in Figure 1,
no ﬁrm that was spared by the crisis cut base wages. Moreover, less than30
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1 percent of ﬁrms that were faced by a drop in turnover cut the salaries of
their employees.
This result points out a phenomenon that is widely discussed in the eco-
nomic literature, namely that in response to a decline in demand ﬁrms would
rather dismiss employees than cut their base wages. This corresponds to the
ﬁndings of Agell and Lundborg (2003), who in 1998, following the most
severe recession since the 1930s, asked Swedish ﬁrms whether they had re-
duced nominal wages in previous years. Out of 153 responding ﬁrms, only
two stated that they had cut wages. Agell and Bennmarker (2007) also inter-
viewed Swedish ﬁrms after the 1990s recession and arrived at the conclusion
that only about 1 percent of employees covered by their sample had had
to accept wage cuts. Accordingly, not even several years of high unemploy-
ment in Sweden (roughly 10 percent at the beginning of 1999) were able to
make nominal wages more ﬂexible. Such observations were also described in
Akerlof et al. (1996).
Since the responses summarised in Figure 1 only reﬂect companies’ most
important cost-cutting measure in reaction to the crisis and for this reason
do not cover possible wage cuts or wage freezes that represent the second
most important cost-saving measure, the survey 2009 included more detailed
questions on this issue (see Questions 5 and 6 in Appendix A).
Each responding company was asked whether it planned or had already
been forced to cut or freeze wages due to the crisis. The replies to this
question as well as those provided on this issue in the 2007 survey (though
of a more general nature) are summarised in Table 6. Some 89 percent
of companies said they were not planning or had not implemented wage31
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Table 6: Wage Freezes and Wage Cuts
Survey 2007 Survey 2009
Wage freezes Wage cuts Wage freezes Wage cuts
in the last 5 years in the last year
Implemented 9.52 1.83 2.19 2.36
Planned - - 9.07 1.84
No intention - - 88.74 95.80
Notes to Table 6: The ﬁgures are weighted by employment weights and are rescaled
excluding non-responses. They include only answers from ﬁrms that responded to both
questionnaires (2007 and 2009).
freezes due to the current crisis. About 2 percent reported to have negotiated
wage freezes, 9 percent were planning to do so. Wage cuts were even more
rare. About 96 percent of the companies surveyed replied that they were
not planning to cut wages, and only 2 percent said they had already reduced
wages or were planning to do so.
Again it is possible to compare these results with those of the 2007 survey.
In both surveys, about 2 percent of companies surveyed reported to have
negotiated wage cuts. In the 2007 survey, however, companies were asked
about wage cuts they had implemented over the previous ﬁve years, while the
2009 survey referred to the past year only. This means that some 2 percent
of the surveyed companies reduced wages between 2002 and 2006, and an
equal amount did so in 2008/2009. Interestingly, not a single company that
reported wage cuts between 2002 and 2006 said it had reduced wages in 2009,
and vice versa.
These results indicate downward nominal wage rigidity in Austria. The
following section deals with possible explanations for these rigidities.32
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4 Explaining the Rigidity of Base Wages
Within the scope of the survey 2007, Austrian ﬁrms were asked why they
would avoid base wage cuts. Respondents were presented with eight promi-
nent theories explaining downward nominal wage rigidities, which they could
grade. Such a question was not included in the survey 2009. Hence, a com-
parison between the subjective reasons for wage rigidities before and in the
crisis cannot be drawn for Austria.
4.1 Eﬃciency Wage Theories are Highly Appreciated
In the Austrian survey conducted in the year 2007 ﬁrms were asked to assign
a score from 1 (irrelevant) to 4 (highly relevant) to each of eight theories.
Column 1 in Table 7 gives an estimate of the mean value of all scores assigned,
ranking the theories according to the average number of scores achieved. In
an alternative ranking approach, ratings of 3 (relevant) and 4 (highly rele-
vant) are interpreted as approval of a theory, whereas 1 (irrelevant) and 2 (of
little relevance) are rated as disapproval. Column 2 in Table 7 indicates the
rate of approval by theory according to this alternative approach. However,
ranking the theories in line with the alternative approach largely corresponds
to ranking them by the mean value.
The ranking itself shall, however, not be overrated in the following inter-
pretation of the results. The mean values of the theories with a top ranking
lie within a very narrow band and, correspondingly, all theories reaching an
average score of more than 3 or gaining the approval of almost 80 percent of
respondents shall be deemed widely accepted explanations of nominal wage
rigidities.33
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Table 7: Ranking of Theories Explaining Sticky Wages
Reasons preventing Mean Approval
base wage cuts value rate
1 Reduces employees’ eﬀort 3.36 91.40
2 Reduces employees’ morale 3.31 88.15
3 Collective wage agreements 3.29 79.58
4 Most productive employees leave 3.25 85.58
5 Increases labour turnover costs 3.10 78.86
6 Firm’s reputation suﬀers 2.99 70.85
7 External wages matter 2.83 70.75
8 Implicit contracts 2.29 43.95
Notes to Table 7: The ﬁgures are weighted by employment weights and are rescaled ex-
cluding non-responses. Only the survey 2007 contained this question. Hence, a comparison
between 2007 and 2009 is not available.
The ﬁndings summarised in Table 7 basically conﬁrm previous results
found in survey literature. As in Campbell and Kamlani (1997) and in Fabi-
ani et al. (2010), the theory on employees’ eﬀort (1), the thesis on employees’
morale (2), the adverse selection model applied to quits (4) as well as the
turnover model (5) obtain high rates of approval also in this survey. All these
explanatory models belong to the family of eﬃciency wage theories.
The theory that wage cuts would reduce the employees’ eﬀort (1) recorded
a more than 90 percent approval rate. The theory described in detail by Be-
wley (1995, 1998, 1999) that wage cuts reduce employees’ morale (2) and, as
a consequence, their eﬀort ﬁnds similarly high acceptance with the respon-
dents. Bewley argues that employers think an apparent fall in the employees’
standard of living and the insult implied by lower pay would result in a loss
in loyalty toward the company. On the basis of this reasoning, Howitt (2002)
concludes that companies would consider cutting base wages only in cases of34
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extreme ﬁnancial diﬃculty. Moreover, this theory explains why ﬁrms prefer
to lay oﬀ workers instead of cutting their base wages. Layoﬀs only hurt the
morale of those leaving the company, while wage cuts have a lasting eﬀect
on the eﬀort and productivity of remaining staﬀ and, thus, on the ﬁrm.
Furthermore, the adverse selection model applied to quits (4) appears to
be widely accepted. Around 86 percent of ﬁrms agreed that the most produc-
tive employees would leave the company following a wage cut. This conforms
to the ﬁndings of Campbell and Kamlani (1997) and Fabiani et al. (2010)
who also report high approval rates for this theory. The adverse selection
model provides another explanation for the question why ﬁrms prefer dis-
missals to wage cuts. While wage cuts cause the most productive employees
to leave the ﬁrm, dismissals may be used selectively to lay oﬀ less productive
employees.
Finally, also the theory on increased staﬀ turnover (5) receives an average
score of more than 3, with the approval rate being just below 80 percent.
According to this theory, ﬁrms are reluctant to cut wages because this would
make more employees leave the ﬁrm and entail higher costs for hiring and
training new staﬀ. This theory, too, ranks high in Campbell and Kamlani
(1997) as well as in Blinder and Choi (1990).
4.2 Collective Agreements also Prevent Base Wage Cuts
Apart from eﬃciency wage theories describing the reasons for wage rigidi-
ties, in Austria collective wage agreements (3) also appear to play a role in
explaining sticky wages. This is in line with the ﬁndings of Fabiani et al.
(2010) who report that labour market regulations and collective agreements35
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are very relevant in explaining sticky base wages in euro area countries. How-
ever, Fabiani et al. (2010) show that such labour market frictions are only
relevant explanations in euro area countries, while they do not seem to be
equally important for employers in Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech
Republic and Hungary (all non-euro area countries in their sample).
In Austria around 80 percent of ﬁrms indicated that collective wage agree-
ments prevent wage cuts (see Table 7). In strictly contractual terms, collec-
tive agreements can prevent wage cuts in only two cases. Firstly, when the
minimum wage laid down in the collective agreement is being paid. In this
case the negotiated increase of the minimum wage is binding, as wages must
not fall below that level. Secondly, in some collective agreements not only the
increase of the minimum wage, but on top of that also an increase of higher
wages, which is binding, is negotiated. These “Ist-Lohnverhandlungen” are,
however, only present in about 10 percent of all collective agreements. Apart
from these two cases, the negotiated wage increase laid down in collective
agreements is not binding for ﬁrms. Hence, the collective agreement does
not prevent wage cuts in legal terms. However, it cannot be ruled out that
ﬁrms’ answers to this question also reﬂect the social pressure associated with
collective wage agreements, which makes it diﬃcult for them to cut wages
while they are being raised for similar employees in other ﬁrms.
In order to shed some light on this question, we take a closer look at
which ﬁrms regard collective agreements as a ‘relevant’ and ‘highly relevant’
explanation for wage rigidities. Therefore, we estimate a probit model and
let the endogenous variable yi be equal to unity if a ﬁrm has indicated that
collective agreements are ‘relevant’ and ‘highly relevant’ for explaining sticky36
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wages and zero, otherwise.
We are interested in the question whether ﬁrms perceive collective agree-
ments as prohibitive for base wage cuts because the agreement literally pre-
vents it or because of the social pressure stemming from collective agreements
in general. Therefore, we deﬁne a dummy variable that is equal to unity for
industries having “Ist-Lohnverhandlungen”. These are found in some areas
of the manufacturing sector (NACE-codes): 10, 16, 17, 20 and 24), in the
energy sector (NACE-code: 35) and in the construction sector (NACE-code:
41-43).5 Moreover, this dummy variable is set equal to one, if the industry
is known as paying mainly minimum-wages. This it true for ﬁrms manufac-
turing textiles (NACE-code: 13), ﬁrms in the retail business (NACE-code:
47) and for hotels and restaurants (NACE-code: 55-56). In summary, this
dummy variable indicates whether collective agreements are likely to be bind-
ing in contractual terms.
For a general robustness check, we include the variable ‘collective wage
agreements’ in our model. It is a continuous variable giving the share of
employees in a ﬁrm that is covered by a collective agreement. We expect ﬁrms
with a low share of collective agreements to be less likely to perceive them as
obstructive to wage cuts. Moreover, the variable ‘ﬁrm level wage agreements’
contains information on whether a ﬁrm additionally to collective agreements
negotiates also wage agreements at the ﬁrm level. As these agreements are
often based on quite institutionalised negotiations with the workers’ council,
they might be perceived as additional obstacle to wage cuts. The variable is
equal to one if the ﬁrm negotiates wages at the ﬁrm level and zero, otherwise.
5“Ist-Lohnverhandelungen” are also taking place in the telecommunications industry,
which is, however, not covered by the sample 2007.37
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After having learned in Section 3.3 that the labour intensity of a ﬁrm is
highly relevant for its decision to dismiss employees, we also want to take
it into account when analysing the ﬁrms’ perception of wage rigidity. Put
diﬀerently, it could well be that labour-intensive ﬁrms are more likely to
perceive collective agreements as binding and thus, prefer to lay employees
oﬀ rather than to cut their base wages. Moreover, we include the variable
‘share of bonus payments’, which indicates the share of ﬂexible wage com-
ponents. These wage components are not covered by collective agreements.
Thus, it is conceivable, that ﬁrms with more leeway in cutting other wage
components than base wages, perceive collective agreements as less binding.
Finally, we also include the economic situation of a ﬁrm as explanatory vari-
able. As Messina and R˜ o˜ om (2009) ﬁnd that the absolute popularity of a
theory of wage stickiness depends on the economic situation of the ﬁrm (and
is thus state dependent), we control for the economic environment. The ques-
tionnaire 2007 contains a question on the development of a ﬁrm’s revenues
compared to last year’s revenues. Hence, respondents could indicate whether
revenues were ‘much higher’, ‘higher’, ‘unchanged’, ‘lower’ or ‘much lower’.
We include this set of dummy variables and use the category ‘much higher’
as base category.
Table 8 shows the results of the probit model. The table gives average
marginal eﬀects and the signs of the coeﬃcients are as expected. Firstly,
we ﬁnd that ﬁrms operating in industries with “Ist-Lohnverhandlungen” and
mainly paying minimum wages are indeed more likely to perceive collective
agreements as binding restrictions for base wage cuts. A ﬁrm in one of
these industries is on average by about 12 percentage points more likely to38
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Table 8: Probit Model Explaining which Type of Firm Regard Collective
Wage Agreements as Important Explanation Preventing Base Wage Cuts
Average
marginal eﬀects
Binding collective agreements 0.12 ***
(0.04)
Collective wage agreements 0.37 ***
(0.11)
Firm level wage agreements 0.14 ***
(0.05)
Share of labour costs 0.08
(0.12)








Much lower revenues 0.06
(0.16)
Pseudo R2 0.08
Number of observations 314
Notes to Table 8: The table gives average marginal eﬀects. Standard errors calculated
using the Delta-method are given in parenthesis. ∗∗∗ stands for signiﬁcant at the 1 percent
level. The model includes a set of dummies for the economic situation of a ﬁrm, where
the variable ‘much higher revenues’ (than last year) serves as base category.39
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indicate that collective agreements cause wage stickiness. Secondly, we ﬁnd
that a high share of employees covered by collective agreements - both at the
ﬁrm level and at a higher level - also inﬂuences this perception positively.
The coeﬃcients on the share of labour costs in total costs and the one on
the share of bonus payments in total labour costs show the expected signs.
However, statistically they are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Also
the economic situation does not seem to have an eﬀect on the perception of
collective agreements with regard to wage rigidity.
Summing up, we present evidence that collective agreements prevent wage
cuts not only because of social pressure but also in strictly contractual terms.
Firms operating in industries where collective agreements are likely to be
binding have a higher probability of perceiving them as obstacles for wage
cuts. However, although we ﬁnd this statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence, also
ﬁrms with non-binding contracts perceive them as preventive for wage cuts.
While 86 percent of ﬁrms with binding collective agreements in our sample
perceive them as obstacles for wage cuts, also 74 percent of ﬁrms having no
binding collective agreements perceive them similarly. Hence, we conclude
that collective agreements have two eﬀects on employers - the real contractual
barrier as well as the social pressure stemming from it - both of which explain
why they are perceived as prohibitive for wage cuts.
While it is not possible for Austria to compare these results from the 2007
survey with data from 2009 and analyse the eﬀect of the crisis, Messina and
R˜ o˜ om (2009) conduct such a comparison for three other European countries,
namely France, Italy and Poland. They conclude that the relative relevance
(the ranking) of the diﬀerent explanations remain almost identical. How-40
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1274
December 2010
ever, all explanations lose absolute popularity because of the crisis and the
slack in the labour market. For some explanations, e.g. that ﬁrms refrain
from cutting wages because workers would leave and it would be diﬃcult
to attract new workers, the support from respondents more than halved.
Labour regulations and collective bargaining schemes as another explanation
for rigid wages also lost popularity, however, at a much lower rate than all
other explanations.
Hence, following Messina and R˜ o˜ om (2009), the popularity of collective
agreements as an explanation for wage rigidity is likely to drop during a
recession. This might be an additional argument that collective agreements
are not only preventing wage cuts in legal terms but also because of social
pressures that fade in times of crisis.
4.3 Implicit Contracts are Less Relevant in Explaining
Wage Rigidities
Coming back to the results shown in Table 7, we now turn to those theories
which were less popular among our respondents. At an approval rate of about
70 percent, somewhat less relevance seems to be attributed to the thesis that
wage cuts have a negative eﬀect on a ﬁrm’s reputation (6) and that hiring
new staﬀ would be more diﬃcult in the future. The rate of approval to
Keynes (1936) argument that wage hierarchy is important for employees (7)
points into the same direction. According to this theory, employees oppose
wage cuts that do not equally aﬀect the overall distribution of wages.
Acceptance is found to be lowest for the theory of implicit contracts (8).
Like the surveyed ﬁrms in Blinder and Choi (1990), only few Austrian ﬁrms41
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(close to 44 percent) think that wage rigidities are caused by an implicit
contract between ﬁrms and employees. According to the implicit contract
theory, pay does not ﬂuctuate with the business cycle and thus, risk-averse
employees can keep their standard of living constant regardless of the state
of the economy. The implicit contract would, therefore, prevent wage cuts in
phases of low demand. While implicit contracts are important in explaining
price rigidities in Austria, as described in Kwapil et al. (2005), they seem to
have considerably less relevance for explaining wage rigidities.
5 Summarising Conclusions
This paper focuses on the behaviour of Austrian ﬁrms during the recession
2008/2009. We document that Austrian companies are reluctant to cut base
wages not only under normal circumstances but also - albeit to a lesser extent
- in times of crisis. Although our analysis reveals that during the latest
economic crisis, more companies have reduced base wages than in non-crisis
times, wage cuts are an exception rather than the rule. While in the 2007
survey, some 2 percent of companies reported to have cut base wages over
the previous ﬁve years, an equal proportion of companies said they had done
so - within one year - during the recession 2008/2009. This conﬁrms that
the frequency of wage cuts increases during a recession and at the same time
indicates the existence of nominal wage rigidities in Austria.
Looking for explanations of nominal downward wage rigidities, we ﬁnd
that eﬃciency wage theories as well as institutional arrangements like collec-
tive wage agreements are the most popular causes indicated by our respon-
dents. Our reading of the Austrian results is that collective wage agreements42
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are not only a barrier to wage cuts because they literally enjoin them, but also
because of social pressure. It might be diﬃcult for a ﬁrm to cut wages, while
they are being raised for similar employees in other enterprises. According
to Messina and R˜ o˜ om (2009), the absolute importance of all explanations
of wage rigidity decreases in times of crisis. Also collective agreements lose
popularity as an explanation for wage rigidity, however, it does so at a much
lower rate than all other explanations. Hence, collective wage agreements
become relatively more important in explaining wage rigidities when there is
slack in the labour market.
Nominal wage rigidities are responsible for companies responding to the
shock by changing labour input rather than prices. Accordingly, our results
show that while cutting base wages is always (regardless how hard the crisis
hit) the reaction preferred the least, the most popular reaction of Austrian
ﬁrms is cutting working hours. This is compatible with the results from
macro data showing that the reduction in employment in Austria during the
crisis was relatively mild, while the main adjustment burden was borne by
the reduction in working hours.
During the crisis we saw a signiﬁcant shift towards reducing labour costs
instead of non-labour costs. Our analysis shows that ﬁrms that were severely
hit by the crisis are signiﬁcantly more likely to cut labour costs than non-
labour costs. However, the size of the shock does not seem to aﬀect the
decision on how to reduce labour costs. The choice between dismissing em-
ployees and cutting labour costs by other means is inﬂuenced by the produc-
tion technology and workforce characteristics and not by the dimension of
the drop in demand. Companies with labour-intensive production technolo-43
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gies, employing a high share of young and low-skilled employees are more
likely to dismiss workers.
The Austrian example shows that wage rigidities do not necessarily lead to
a dramatic increase in unemployment, but can also be dealt with by reducing
working hours. This might, however, only be possible, when ﬁrms perceive
the crisis as a temporary phenomenon.
Our work adds to the discussion on how to tackle wage rigidities by
advising caution. The results suggest that the most important causes of wage
rigidities are eﬃciency wage theories and arguments dealing with fairness and
morale - characteristics of a system that cannot be changed by law. Labour
market institutions, like collective wage agreements, are only one among
several explanations. However, as Messina and R˜ o˜ om (2009) argue, they
seem to become relatively more important in times of crisis.
References
Agell, J., Bennmarker, H., 2007. Wage incentives and wage rigidity: A rep-
resentative view from within. Labour Economics 14, 347–369.
Agell, J., Lundborg, P., 1995. Theories of pay and unemployment: Survey
evidence from Swedish manufacturing ﬁrms. Scandinavian Journal of Eco-
nomics 97, 295–307.
Agell, J., Lundborg, P., 2003. Survey evidence on wage rigidity and un-
employment: Sweden in the 1990s. Scandinavian Journal of Economics
105 (1), 15–29.
Akerlof, G., Dickens, W., Perry, G., 1996. The Macroeconomics of Low In-44
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1274
December 2010
ﬂation. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Brookings Institution,
Washington D.C.
Bertola, G., Dabusinskas, A., Hoeberichts, M., Izquierdo, M., Kwapil, C.,
Montornes, J., Radowski, D., 2010. Price, wage and employment response
to shocks: Evidence from the WDN survey. Working paper No. 1164, Eu-
ropean Central Bank.
Bewley, T., 1995. A depressed labor market as explained by participants.
American Economic Review 85 (2), 250–254.
Bewley, T., 1998. Why not cut pay? European Economic Review 42, 459–
490.
Bewley, T., 1999. Why Wages Don’t Fall during a Recession. Harvard Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge, MA.
Blinder, A., Choi, D., 1990. A shred of evidence on theories of wage stickiness.
Quarterly Journal of Economics 105 (4), 1003–1015.
Breuss, F., Kaniovski, S., Schratzenstaller, M., 2009. Gesamtwirtschaftliche
Auswirkungen der Konjunkturpakete I und II und der Steuerreform 2009.
Oesterreichisches Institut fuer Wirtschaftsforschung, Vienna, Austria.
Campbell, C., Kamlani, K., 1997. The reasons for wage rigidity: Evidence
from a survey of ﬁrms. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (3), 759–789.
Dickens, W., Goette, L., Groshen, E., Holden, S., Messina, J., Schweitzer,
M., Turunen, J., Ward-Warmedinger, M., 2007. How wages change: Mi-45
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1274
December 2010
cro evidence from the International Wage Flexibility Project. Journal of
Economic Perspectives 21 (2), 195–214.
Fabiani, S., Druant, M., Hernando, I., Kwapil, C., Landau, B., Loupias,
C., Martins, F., Mathae, T., Sabbatini, R., Stahl, H., Stokman, A., 2006.
What ﬁrms’ surveys tell us about price-setting behaviour in the euro area.
International Journal of Central Banking September, 3–47.
Fabiani, S., Galuscak, K., Kwapil, C., Lamo, A., R˜ o˜ om, T., 2010. Wage
rigidities and labour market adjustment in Europe. Journal of the Euro-
pean Economic Association 8, 497–505.
Franz, W., Pfeiﬀer, F., 2006. Reasons for wage rigidity in germany. LABOUR
20 (2), 255–284.
Howitt, P., 2002. Looking inside the labor market: A review article. Journal
of Economic Literature 40 (1), 125–138.
Keynes, J. M., 1936. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and
Money. Macmillan, London.
Kwapil, C., Baumgartner, J., Scharler, J., 2005. The price-setting behavior of
Austrian ﬁrms - some survey evidence. Working paper No. 464, European
Central Bank.
Messina, J., R˜ o˜ om, T., 2009. Downward wage rigidity during the current
ﬁnancial and economic crisis. Working paper series, forthcoming, European
Central Bank.46
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1274
December 2010
Stiglbauer, A., 2010. The Austrian labor market and the Great Recession:
Developments and measures taken. Monetary Policy and the Economy
Q3/2010, Oesterreichische Nationalbank, 25–44.47
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1274
December 2010
A Appendix: Questionnaire of the WDN-Survey
2009
1   To what extent is your firm’s activity (in terms of sales) 
affected by the current economic and financial crisis? 
Positively (increased) .................................................................................  ! ! ! !" " " "
Unchanged ...................................................................................................... ! ! ! !" " " "
Negatively (decreased) 
               declined marginally ..................................................................  ! ! ! !
               declined moderately ................................................................  ! ! ! !
               declined strongly .......................................................................  ! ! ! !
               declined exceptionally strongly...........................................  ! ! ! !
2   To what extent is the current economic and financial crisis 
affecting your firm with respect to each of the following 
aspects? 
Please choose an option for each line! 
                                                   exceptionally    moder-  not  don’t 
strongly strongly  ately  at  all  know 
Fall in the demand  
for your firm’s  
products/services ! ! ! !" " " "! ! ! !" " " "! ! ! !" " " "! ! ! !" " " "! ! ! !" " " "
Difficulty in financing  
through the usual  
financial channels ! ! ! !" " " "! ! ! !" " " "! ! ! !" " " "! ! ! !" " " "! ! ! !
Difficulty in being  
paid by customers ! ! ! !" " " "! ! ! !" " " "! ! ! !" " " "! ! ! !" " " "! ! ! !
Difficulty in obtaining  
intermediate products  
from your usual suppliers ! ! ! !" " " "! ! ! !" " " "! ! ! !" " " "! ! ! !" " " "! ! ! !
3   If the current economic and financial crisis is causing a fall 
in the demand for your firm’s products/services, which of 
the following strategies has your firm adopted (or is going 
to adopt) to face such a fall? 
Please choose an option for each line! 
                                                           very    hardly  not  don’t 
 relevant  relevant  relevant  at  all  know 
We reduce  
output ! ! ! !" " " "! ! ! !" " " "! ! ! !" " " "! ! ! !" " " "! ! ! !" " " "
We leave prices 
unchanged ! ! ! !" " " "! ! ! !" " " "! ! ! !" " " "! ! ! !" " " "! ! ! !
We decrease prices  ! ! ! !" " " "! ! ! !" " " "! ! ! !" " " "! ! ! !" " " "! ! ! !" " " "
We decrease  
profit margins ! ! ! !" " " "! ! ! !" " " "! ! ! !" " " "! ! ! !" " " "! ! ! !
We reduce costs ! ! ! !" " " "! ! ! !" " " "! ! ! !" " " "! ! ! !" " " "! ! ! !" " " "
4   If the reduction of costs is of any relevance in your answer
to question 3, please indicate the main channel through
which this goal is achieved in your firm. 
Please choose a single option, the most important factor! 
We reduce flexible wage components  
(for example bonuses, benefits, etc.) ..................................................  ! ! ! !
We reduce base wages..............................................................................  ! ! ! !
We adjust the number of hours worked per employee................  ! ! ! !
We reduce the number of temporary  
employees / other type of workers........................................................  ! ! ! !
We reduce the number of permanent employees .........................  ! ! ! !
We reduce non-labour costs....................................................................  ! ! ! !
5   In the current economic and financial crisis, has your firm
frozen (or is it going to freeze) the base wage of some
employees? 
Yes, we plan to freeze nominal wages.  
For what percentage share of your employees?....... __________ %
Yes, we have already frozen nominal wages.  
For what percentage share of your employees?....... __________ %
No ........................................................................................................................  ! ! ! !
6   In the current economic and financial crisis, has your firm
(or is it going to) cut the base wage of some employees? 
Yes, we plan wage cuts.  
For what percentage share of your employees?....... __________ %
Yes, we have already cut wages.  
For what percentage share of your employees?....... __________ %
We cannot cut base wages,  
because we pay the minimum wage.  
For what percentage share of your employees?....... __________ %
No ........................................................................................................................  ! ! ! !
7   In the current economic and financial crisis is your firm
benefiting from government measures aimed at avoiding
loss of workers or wage cuts? 
Yes, we plan to participate in a  
government programme.  
For what percentage share of your employees?....... __________ %
Yes, we participate in a  
government programme. 
For what percentage share of your employees?....... __________ %
No ........................................................................................................................  ! ! ! !Working PaPer SerieS
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